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Abstract—X-ray security screening is in widespread use to
maintain transportation security against a wide range of potential
threat profiles. Of particular interest is the recent focus on the
use of automated screening approaches, including the potential
anomaly detection as a methodology for concealment detection
within complex electronic items. Here we address this problem
considering varying segmentation strategies to enable the use
of both object level and sub-component level anomaly detection
via the use of secondary convolutional neural network (CNN)
architectures. Relative performance is evaluated over an extensive
dataset of exemplar cluttered X-ray imagery, with a focus on
consumer electronics items. We find that sub-component level
segmentation produces marginally superior performance in the
secondary anomaly detection via classification stage, with true
positive of ∼ 98% of anomalies, with a ∼ 3% false positive.
Index Terms—X-ray imagery, electronics item, superpixel,
anomaly detection, CNN, classification
I. INTRODUCTION
X-ray baggage security screening is widely used to maintain
aviation and transport security, itself posing a significant
image-based screening task for human operators reviewing
compact, cluttered and highly varying baggage contents within
limited time-scales. With both increased passenger throughput
in the global travel network and an increasing focus on wider
aspects of extended border security (e.g. freight, shipping,
postal), this poses both a challenging and timely automated
image classification task.
Prior work in the field has notably concentrated on the
shaped-based detection of both threat and contraband (un-
declared) items within X-ray imagery achieving both high
detection performance with low false positive reporting [1]–
[4]. However, such approaches are insufficient when dealing
with the detection of unknown anomalous items or materials
potentially concealed within complex items such as consumer
electronic devices.
Whilst existing security scanners use dual-energy X-ray for
materials discrimination, and highlight specific image regions
matching existing threat material profiles [5], [6], the detec-
tion of generalized anomalies within complex items remains
challenging [7] (e.g. Figure 1).
Within machine learning, anomaly detection involves learn-
ing a pattern or distribution of normality for a given data
source and thus detecting significant deviations from this
norm [8]. Anomaly detection is an area of significant in-
terest within computer vision, spanning biomedical imaging
BA
Fig. 1. Exemplar consumer electronics item within X-ray security imagery
with both material (red box, A) and embedded object (red box, B) anomaly
present.
[9] to video surveillance [10]. In our consideration of X-
ray security imagery, we are looking for abnormalities that
indicate concealment or subterfuge whilst working against a
real-world adversary who may evolve their strategy to avoid
detection. Such anomalies may present (or conceal) themselves
within appearance space in the form of an unusual shape,
texture or material density (i.e. dual energy X-ray colour) [11].
Alternatively they may present themselves in a semantic form,
where the appearance of unfamiliar objects either globally or
locally within the X-ray image [12].
Prior work on appearance and semantic anomaly detection,
has considered unique feature representation as a critical
component for detection within cluttered X-ray imagery [13].
Early work on anomaly detection in X-ray security imagery
[1], implements block-wise correlation analysis between two
temporally aligned scanned X-ray images. More recently [14],
anomalous X-ray items within freight containers have been
detected using auto-encoder networks, and additionally via the
use convolutional neural network (CNN) extracted features
as a learned representation of normality across stream-of-
commerce parcel X-ray images [13]. In a similar vein, the
work of [15] focuses on the use of a novel adversarial training
architecture to detect anomalies as high reconstruction errors
produced from a generator network adversarially trained on
non-anomalous (benign) stream-of-commerce X-ray imagery
only.
However, the majority of this prior anomaly detection
work is focused at the image or object level, where anomaly
presence is clear in appearance or semantic space, by asking
the global question - is the image anomalous?
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Fig. 2. Exemplar X-ray imagery (A) used for object level anomaly detection (B/C) via mask R-CNN segmentation and sub-component level anomaly detection
(D) via superpixel over-segmentation.
These approaches [13]–[15], fail to address the fact that
anomaly presence maybe subtle and concealed (i.e. present)
within a semantically benign object itself (e.g. Figure 1 A/B).
In this case, we wish to ask a highly localised question - is
this part of this complex object within the image anomalous ?
In order to address this issue, we consider the task of image
segmentation - if we first segment a class of object from
the image, then potentially segment that object into its sub-
components how well can this issue of subtle and concealed
anomaly detection be addressed.
To these ends, we introduce a side-by-side comparison of
both object and sub-component level segmentation strategies
for this case of intra-object anomaly detection. While anomaly
detection at an object level is more common, the detection in
sub-component level is still at infancy. The key concept is that
whilst subtle localised anomalies maybe difficult to detect via
an image level anomaly detection approach, we can instead
target object level or sub-component level anomaly detection
in isolation. Hence a more general learning-driven approach
can developed at the object or sub-component level instead
of tackling global signatures across all possible objects - and
thus being able to tell if they are anomalous or benign in
appearance / semantic space.
Following the work in Zhang et al, [16] where they leverage
the use of superpixels [17] within X-ray cargo image classifi-
cation, we complement such approach with prior object seg-
mentation [18] as an enabler to sub-component level anomaly
detection within X-ray security imagery. Using contemporary
object segmentation via mask Region-based CNN (R-CNN)
[18] and Simple Linear Iterative Clustering (SLIC) [17] su-
perpixels, we evaluate alternate strategies for the detection
of subtle intra-object anomalies at either a generalised object
level or sub-component level segmentation strategy, thus fa-
cilitating effective anomaly detection independent of resolute
object classification (Section II). Our work is evaluated over
a range of large consumer electronics items with and without
intra-object anomaly presence (Section III).
II. PROPOSED APPROACH
Our approach considers two automatic segmentation strate-
gies for intra-object anomaly detection in X-ray security
imagery (Sec. II-A), as illustrated in the Figure 2A:- first,
object level segmentation is performed (Figures 2B → 2C)
and secondly, sub-component level segmentation is performed
(Figure 2C → 2D). This is followed by secondary scale-
specific variants to contemporary deep CNN architectures
for final anomaly detection as a binary, {anomaly, benign},
classification task (Sec. II-B).
A. Segmentation Strategies
Object Level Segmentation: Our first segmentation strategy
builds upon the Faster R-CNN [19] X-ray security image
specific work of [4], to augment this model by adding two
additional convolutional layers to construct a object boundary
segmentation mask, following the Mask R-CNN concept of
[18]. This is performed by adding an additional branch to
Faster R-CNN that outputs an additional image mask indicat-
ing pixel membership of a given detected object. Mask R-CNN
[18] also addresses feature map misalignment, found in Faster
R-CNN [19] for higher resolution feature map boundaries, via
bilinear boundary interpolation. Our Mask R-CNN is applied
to an input X-ray image (Figure 2A) with segmented object
(Figure 2B then isolated from the image for subsequent object
level anomaly detection (Figure 2C).
Sub-component Level Segmentation: Our second segmenta-
tion strategy uses image over-segmentation via Simple Linear
Iterative Clustering (SLIC) [17] superpixels. It performs iter-
ative clustering in a similar manner to k-means, where the
image is segmented into approximately equally-sized super-
pixels, whose total number k is user-defined. SLIC represents
each pixel in R5, defined by the {L, a, b} values of CIELAB
colour space and the (x, y) pixel coordinate. Instead of using
Euclidean distance, SLIC introduce a new distance measure
that considers superpixel size. SLIC takes as input a desired
number of approximately equally-sized superpixel K, and for
the images with N pixels, with the approximate size of each
superpixel will be N/K. Each of every approximately equally-
sized superpixels, there will be a superpixel center at every
grid interval S =
√
N/K. Let
[
li, ai, bi, xi, yi
]T
be the five
dimensional point of a pixel, cluster center Ck should be in
the same form as
[
lk, ak, bk, xk, yk
]T
. The distance measure
Dk is defined as:
dlab =
√
(lk − li)2 + (ak − ai)2 + (nk − bi)2
dxy =
√
(xk − xi)2 + (yk − yi)2
Ds = dlab +
m
S
dxy
(1)
Fig. 3. Sub-component level object segmentation: each segment (pink
contours) is extracted prior to CNN classification.
where Ds is the sum of the lab distance and the xy plane
distance normalized by the grid interval S. Variable m is
introduced to control the compactness of the superpixel with
the local convexity or concavity shape of each superpixel
dependant on m (low m reduces the influence of coordinate in-
formation while for a high m each superpixel will approximate
a square shape). Our m = 20 choice (by taking consideration
of the size of the object present in an image), results in a set
superpixel region conforming to convex and concave image
shape boundaries as illustrated in the Figure 3.
B. Secondary Classification
Each segmented image region, from object level or sub-
component level segmentation, is subsequently classified us-
ing a deep CNN architecture model formulated as a binary,
{anomaly, benign}, classification task. Three contemporary
generalised CNN architectures plus leading fine-grain CNN
classification approaches [20]–[22], specifically targeting the
sub-categorization of pre-determined object types, are consid-
ered to form the basis of our anomaly detection study.
VGG-16 [23] is a seminal network architecture that consists
of 16 deep convolutional layers, with a fixed kernel size of 3,
stacked on top of each other in increasing depth.
SqueezeNet [24] is a small network architecture that uses
many 1-by-1 filters to aggressively reduce the number of
weights. It offers equivalent accuracy to the AlexNet [25] yet
operating with 50× fewer parameters.
ResNet-50 [26] solves the issue of vanishing gradient
present in the forward feed and backward propagation process-
ing in previous CNN architectures by introducing skip connec-
tion, parallel to the regular convolutional layers numbering 50
in depth.
Fine-grain Classification [20]–[22] is put into effect as we
can consider the task of anomaly detection in our case as a
fine-grained image classification (FGIC) problem. The Xray
screening imagery used, has very subtle differentiating factors
in the sub-component of a given object (e.g laptop, bottle) and
as such a fine grained approach should be used to detect finer
class-specific discriminatory patches within objects [27], [28].
Bilinear Convolutional Neural Network (BCNN) [20] utilises
a dual VGG-16 architecture in parallel with each stream
implements uncommon, trivial elements of convolution and
max pooling thus allowing focus on two separate distinct parts
of the object. The two streams are concatenated into a bilinear
vector using sum pooling over the outputs of both streams.
This is then used in the final classification by feeding into
the linear layers of the network, and finally a softmax layer
to gain a probabilistic output of the most likely classifications
for the image.
Multi-Attention (MA) [21] optimises part attentions of four
distinct regions of an image using the feature channels in a
VGG-16 architecture. This allows the network to focus on
discriminative factors present in object parts, and use this in
the final classification. Each of the four layers produces a
classification at the end of the network linear layers which
is then grouped by channel grouping loss in order to generate
a final classification for a given object.
Discriminative Filter Bank (DFL) approach [22], heightens the
mid-level network in a VGG-16 based architecture, by learning
a collection of 1×1 convolution filters known as a filter bank
(FB), and a 92×92 with stride 8 to preserve global shape and
appearance dependency in the image data [22]. These filters
when properly initialised and successfully learned can respond
to discriminative regions when convoluted over the image.
When applied to the challenge of X-ray security screening,
for the binary classification problem {anomaly, benign}, the
models should be able to recognise much subtler visual
differences and locations of such parts within object sub-
components which will ultimately lead to more reliable clas-
sification.
Each CNN architecture is trained via a transfer learning
approach, with pre-training on the 1000-class ImageNet [29]
object classification problem, for our final two-class (binary)
X-ray imagery classification problem, {anomaly, benign}.
For both object level and sub-component level segmentation
our resulting image segments are padded and re-scaled to
a common reference dimension (objects: 224 × 224; sub-
components (superpixels): 190 × 150). Dataset imbalance,
a common problem for anomaly detection problems where
anomalous examples can be scarce and challenging to obtain,
is addressed by up-sampling the anomalous class with the
lesser volume of samples. In total training is performed over
a dataset of 14,964 X-ray imagery (70 : 30 data split) and
testing reported over a dataset of 7,878 X-ray imagery (50%:
anomalous and 50%: benign) containing consumer electronics
items.
Training is performed via transfer learning using stochastic
gradient descent with a momentum of 0.9, a learning rate of
0.001, a batch size of 64 and categorical cross-entropy loss. All
networks are trained on NVIDIA 1080 Ti GPU via PyTorch
[30].
III. EVALUATION
Our evaluation considers the comparative performance of:
(a) object level segmentation followed by anomaly detection
via CNN classification (i.e., anomaly present in object as a
whole - {anomaly, benign}) and (b) sub-component level
segmentation followed by anomaly detection via CNN classifi-
cation (i.e., anomaly present in image sub-component patches,
i.e., superpixels - {anomaly, benign}). We consider statistical
TABLE I
SUB-COMPONENT LEVEL SEGMENT CLASSIFICATION OF SECURITY X-RAY IMAGERY USING VARYING CNN ARCHITECTURES.
Strategy Model Architecture A P F1 TP(%) FP(%)
Sub-component
level segmentation
Binary Classification
via CNN
ResNet-18 [26] 97.10 95.40 97.00 98.89 4.69
ResNet-50 [26] 97.20 95.50 97.10 98.99 4.54
SqueezeNet [24] 95.10 92.60 94.70 99.10 8.90
VGG-16 [23] 93.70 91.80 93.30 95.89 8.55
Fine-Grain Classification
BCNN [20] 97.54 95.53 97.49 95.49 4.30
MA [21] 97.68 95.81 97.63 96.32 4.19
DFL [22] 97.91 96.40 97.87 98.20 3.50
TABLE II
OBJECT LEVEL SEGMENT CLASSIFICATION OF SECURITY X-RAY IMAGERY USING VARYING CNN ARCHITECTURES.
Strategy Model Architecture A P F1 TP(%) FP(%)
Object level
segmentation
Binary Classification
via CNN
ResNet-18 [26] 86.20 80.60 76.90 95.42 21.13
ResNet-50 [26] 86.20 84.50 84.50 97.29 16.59
SqueezeNet [24] 83.40 78.10 82.20 93.14 26.97
VGG-16 [23] 76.80 69.60 75.20 94.26 39.47
Fine-Grain Classification DFL [22] 89.77 83.70 89.33 83.70 3.88
Accuracy (A), Precision (P), F-score (F1), True Positive (TP)
and False Positive (FP) as presented in Tables I and II.
The X-ray security imagery dataset used for evaluation
is obtained using a conventional 2D X-ray scanner with
associated false colour materials mapping from dual-energy
X-ray materials information [31]. It comprises large consumer
electronics items (e.g., laptops) with and without intra-object
anomaly concealment present. Anomaly concealments consist
of marzipan, metal screws, metal plates, knife blades and
similar inside the electronic items as illustrated in the examples
of Figure 1 and Figure 2A/B.
Performance evaluation of the object level segmentation and
component level segmentation approaches are performed over
a set of 7, 878 images annotated with ground truth anomaly
location gathered using local access to a dual-view X-ray cabin
baggage security scanner.
From the results presented in Tables I and II, we can observe
that a sub-component level segmentation strategy, supported
by the secondary fine-grain CNN classification of DFL model
[22], offers significantly superior anomaly detection perfor-
mance (A: 97.91, TP: 98.20, FP: 3.50 - Table I) than an
object level segmentation strategy overall (Table II). Further-
more, fine-grain CNN classification similarly offers the highest
overall accuracy and lowest false positive rate (A: 89.77, FP:
3.88 - Table II) for object level segmentation. By contrast,
the use of binary classification via a CNN offers superior
performance for object level segmentation (Table II) in terms
of higher accuracy supported primarily by higher true positive
detection at the expense of false positive reporting. Second
stage binary classification via CNN performed less well overall
with the sub-component segmentation strategy (lower accuracy
(A) caused by significantly higher false positive (FP) - Table
II).
Fine grain classification model (DFL [22]) offer the lowest
false positive and maximal accuracy for both segmentation
strategies (Table I). We can deduce that increased levels iso-
lation via segmentation to the sub-component level improves
the performance of the discriminative feature space learnt by
the fine-grain technique [20]–[22] whilst more classical ob-
ject classification CNN architectures perform only marginally
better on objects than sub-components (Table II).
Figure 4 illustrates the attention (red/pink patch with the
highest focus) of the fine-grain DFL model [22] whilst trained
on object-level and sub-component level segmentation data
respectively. They are generated on the Rectified Linear Unit
(ReLU) activations of the final layer before the fully connected
layer in the VGG-16 [23] architecture of DFL. It is evident
when inspecting these that the sub-level components (Figure 4
second column) show attention over the anomalous parts of the
laptops in each image while the object-level analysis (Figure
4 first column) shows relatively sporadic sparse attention over
the images. This provides qualitative visualization supporting
the performance of the sub-component level segmentation
strategy outperforming object level segmentation.
By enhancing the intermediate layer within the VGG-16 via
a filter bank [22], we can hypothesise that this allows it to learn
edge, corner and texture detail on specific sub-components
at finer-level of the candidate region presented. As a result,
the learned feature representation of anomaly against benign
is highly discriminative leading to a significantly lower false
positive than any other technique - at both the object and sub-
component level (Tables I and II).
Binary classification via CNN using same VGG-16 architec-
ture can achieve high true positive detection at the object level
but at the expense of the highest false positive (TP: 94.25, FP:
39.47 - Table II). This can also be observed for the ResNet and
Object	level	segmentation Sub-component	level	segmentation
Fig. 4. Heatmap generated by convolutional activation map with DFL model
[22] trained on object level segmentation images in first column and sub-
component level segmentation images in second column. This shows where
the model is looking (red/pink colour patch with primary focus regions) when
selecting discriminative regions within the images using.
SqueezeNet architectures. For example, ResNet-50 achieves
true positive of 97.29%, however suffering from high FP of
16.59% for object level segment classification (Table II).
Overall we observe that a sub-component level segmenta-
tion strategy, enabled via object segmentation via Mask R-
CNN [18] and subsequent superpixel over-segmentation via
SLIC [17], consistently outperforms an object level segmen-
tation strategy (via Mask R-CNN [18] alone) when sec-
ondary region classification is performed using a specific fine-
grain CNN variant [22]. The mean runtime for end-to-end
{anomaly, benign} classification strategy (object segmenta-
tion, followed by sub-component level segmentation and fine-
grain classification) is ∼ 500 milliseconds, which is within the
belt speed (0.2meter/second) of standard X-ray scanner [32].
We primarily focus on supervised anomaly detection strate-
gies and compared the performances amongst. Hence we do
not include unsupervised or semi-supervised anomaly detec-
tion strategy [15] in our experiments and we believe it is not an
equitable comparison between supervised and semi-supervised
approaches. To the best our knowledge, the proposed work
on {anomaly, benign} classification within large consumer
electronics items, using sub-component level segmentation
strategy, is first of its kind. As there is no prior related work is
available on the literature of X-ray security imagery (e.g. sub-
component level segmentation classification), we are unable to
compare our strategies with any existing algorithm and present
our results as the benchmark.
Figure 5 shows exemplar qualitative results of sub-
component level segmentation with per superpixel classifica-
tion using the fine-grained DFL [22] approach where we can
see the colour coded set of anomalous (red) as well as benign
(green) sub-component regions within the pre-isolated object-
level image region.
Fig. 5. Sub-component level segmentation via the use of SLIC approach [17]
and classification via fine-grain DFL [22] applied in X- ray security imagery
(red contour: anomaly, green contour: benign).
IV. CONCLUSION
We assess the performance impact of varying segmenta-
tion strategies, such as object level and sub-component level
segmentation, for intra-object anomaly detection within the
context of X-ray security imagery. Our experimental compar-
ison demonstrates the superiority of a sub-component level
segmentation approach in combination with a specific fine-
grain CNN architecture achieving a performance accuracy of
97.91% with a notable 3.50% false positive rate for realistic
anomaly concealment within representative consumer elec-
tronic items.
Future work will consider the conglomerate use of the
multiple sub-component anomaly detection results in the
robust determination of image-level anomaly vs. benign
decision making for a broader range of object types.
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